Abstract. Alice wants to prove that she is young enough to borrow money from her bank, without revealing her age. She therefore needs a tool for proving that a committed number lies in a specific interval. Up to now, such tools were either inefficient (too many bits to compute and to transmit) or inexact (i.e. proved membership to a much larger interval). This paper presents a new proof, which is both efficient and exact. Here, "efficient" means that there are less than 20 exponentiations to perform and less than 2 Kbytes to transmit. The potential areas of application of this proof are numerous (electronic cash, group signatures, publicly verifiable secret encryption, etc. . . ).
Introduction
The idea of checking whether a committed integer lies in a specific interval was first developed in [2] . Such kind of proofs are intensively used in several schemes: electronic cash systems [7] , group signatures [11] , publicly verifiable secret sharing schemes [17, 4] , and other zero-knowledge protocols (e.g. [13, 10] ). Nowadays, there exist two methods to prove that a committed integer is in a specific interval:
-the first one (see e.g. [17] ) allows to prove that the bit-length of the committed number is less or equal to a fixed value k, and hence belongs to [0, 2 k −1]. Unfortunately, this method is very inefficient.
-the second one (see e.g. [2, 8] ) is much more efficient, but the price to pay is that only membership to a much larger interval can be proven.
In this paper, we give a new method to prove that a committed number belongs to an interval that is much more efficient than the first method and that effectively proves, unlike the second method, that a committed number x ∈ I belongs to I (and not a larger interval).
Throughout this paper, Z n denotes the residue class ring modulo n, and Z length, a b is the concatenation of the strings a and b. We denote by I the cardinal of the set I. For g ∈ Z * n and a in the group generated by g, we denote by log g (a) the discrete logarithm of a in base g modulo n, i.e. the number x such that a = g x mod n which belongs to {−ord(g)/2, . . . ,ord(g)/2 − 1}, where ord(g) is the order of g in Z * n . We denote by P K(x : R(x)) a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of x such that R(x) is true. We evaluate the quality of a proof of membership to an interval by the length of the proof (which must be as short as possible) and by its expansion rate (which must be as low as possible).
Known Results
In this subsection, we present three existing proofs of membership to an interval. They are based on zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of a discrete logarithm either modulo a prime (Schnorr [19] ) or a composite number (Girault [16] ). [17] This protocol proves that a committed number
Classical Proof
, where the binary length of b is k. Let p be a large prime number, let q such that q|p − 1, and g and h be elements of order q in Z * p such that the discrete logarithm of h in base g is unknown by Alice. We denote by E(x, r) = g x h r mod p a commitment to x, where r is randomly selected over Z *
, 1} and i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 be the binary representation of x. Alice sets E(x i , r i ) for i = 0, 1, . . . , k −1, where the r i are such that i=0,...,k−1 r i = r, and proves for all i that the number hidden by E(x i , r i ) is either 0 or 1 by proving that she knows either a discrete logarithm of E(x i , r i ) in base h or a discrete logarithm of E(x i , r i )/g in base h. This can be done using proofs of knowledge of a discrete logarithm [19] and a proof of knowledge of one out of two secrets [5] . Bob also checks that i=0,...,k−1 E(x i , r i ) = E(x, r).
Characteristics of this proof: For |p| = 1024 bits, |q| = 1023 bits, |b| = 512 bits, and the Schnorr's proof security parameter t = 90.
-soundness: A cheating prover can succeed with probability less than 1 − (1 − 2 −89 ) 512 < 2 −80 . -zero-knowledge: Perfectly zero-knowledge in the random-oracle model defined in [3] . -what is proven: x ∈ [0, 2 k − 1]. -expansion rate: 1 ≤ δ < 2 (can be decreased to 1 by proving that both x and b − x are k-bit numbers). -length of the proof: 1,612,800 bits = 196.9 kB. [2] This protocol proves that a committed number x ∈ I belongs to J, where the expansion rate J/ I is equal to 3. We give here a slightly different presentation from the one of the original paper.
BCDG Proof
Let t be a security parameter. Let p be a large prime number, let q such that q|p − 1, and g and h be elements of order q in Z * p such that the discrete logarithm of h in base g is unknown by Alice. We denote by E = E(x, r) = g x h r mod p a commitment to x ∈ [0, b], where r is randomly selected over Z * p . For simplicity, we present an interactive version of the protocol which can be easily turned into a non-interactive one using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [15] .
Alice picks random
, and sends to Bob the unordered pair of commitments If c = 1, Alice sends to Bob the value of x + ω j , r + η j for the value j ∈ {1, 2} such that
Characteristics of this proof: For |p| = 1024 bits, |q| = 1023 bits, |b| = 512 bits, t = 80 and l = 40.
-completeness: The proof always succeeds if x ∈ [0, b] -soundness: A cheating prover can succeed with probability less than 2×2
-length of the proof (on average): 225,320 bits = 27.5 kB. [8] The main idea of this proof is roughly the same as the one of [2] . Let t, l and s be three security parameters. This protocol (due to Chan, Frankel and Tsiounis [7] , and corrected in [8] , and also due to [14] in another form) proves that a committed number x ∈ I belongs to J, where the expansion rate J/ I is equal to 2 t+l+1 . Let n be a large composite number whose factorization is unknown by Alice and Bob, g be an element of large order in Z * n and h be an element of the group generated by g such that both the discrete logarithm of g in base h and the discrete logarithm of h in base g are unknown by Alice. Let H be a hashfunction which outputs 2t-bit strings. We denote by E = E(x, r) = g x h r mod n a commitment to x ∈ [0, b], where r is randomly selected over [−2 s n + 1, 2 s n − 1]. This commitment, from [13] , statistically reveals no information about x to Bob.
CFT Proof
1. Alice picks random ω ∈ R [0, 2 t+l b − 1] and η ∈ R [−2 t+l+s n + 1, 2 t+l+s n − 1], and then computes W = g ω h η mod n. 2. Then, she computes C = H(W ) and c = C mod 2 t . 3. Finally, she computes
to Bob, otherwise she starts again the protocol.
Characteristics of this proof: For |n| = 1024 bits, |b| = 512 bits, t = 80, l = 40 and s = 40.
-completeness: The proof succeeds with probability greater than 1
A cheating prover can succeed with probability less than 2 −79 . -zero-knowledge: Statistically zero-knowledge in the random-oracle model. -what is proven:
121 . -length of the proof: 1,976 bits = 0.241 kB.
Our Results
The schemes we propose in this paper are much more efficient than the classical proof and the BCDG proof, and their expansion rates are δ = 1 + ε for the first one, and δ = 1 for the other one, where ε is a negligible quantity with respect to 1 if the considered interval is large enough (ε = 2 −134 if the committed number lies in [0, 2 512 − 1]). We briefly describe our algorithms: first note that it is sufficient to know how to prove that a number is positive to prove that a number belongs to an interval. Indeed, to prove that x belongs to [a, b] , it is sufficient to prove that x − a ≥ 0 and b − x ≥ 0.
Consider the following commitment scheme: to hide an integer x, Alice computes E(x, r) = g x h r mod n, where n is a composite number whose factorization is unknown by both Alice and Bob, g is an element of large order in Z * n , h is an element of large order of the group generated by g such that both the discrete logarithm of g in base h and the discrete logarithm of h in base g are unknown by Alice, r is randomly selected over [−2 s n + 1, 2 s n − 1] and s is a security parameter. This commitment has been introduced in [13] , and statistically reveals no information of x to Bob (see section 2.1). Note that this commitment is homomorphic, i.e. E(x + y, r + s) = E(x, r) × E(y, s) mod n.
Assume that Alice commits herself to a positive integer x by E = E(x, r) and wants to prove that x ∈ [a, b].
In our first scheme, Alice writes the positive integer x − a as the sum of x 2 1 , the greatest square less than x and of ρ, a positive number less than 2 √ x − a (and therefore less than 2 √ b − a). Then, she randomly selects r 1 , r 2 in [0, 2 s n−1] such that r 1 +r 2 = r and computes E 1 = E(x 2 1 , r 1 ) and E 2 = E(ρ, r 2 ). Then, she proves to Bob that E 1 hides a square in Z and that E 2 hides a number whose absolute value is less than 2 t+l+1 √ b − a by a CFT proof. Finally, she applies the same method to b − x. This leads to a proof that
The expansion rate of this proof is equal to 1 + (2 t+l+2 / √ b − a), which becomes close to 1 when b − a is large.
In our second scheme, we artificially enlarge the size of x by setting x = 2 T x. By using the first scheme, we prove that
, and if T is large enough (i.e. T is such that 2
Organization of the Paper
In Section 2, we describe some building blocks used in our protocols: a proof that two commitments hide the same secret, and a proof that a committed number is a square. In Section 3, we describe our two schemes: a proof of membership to an interval with tolerance and a proof of membership without tolerance. Then, we extend our results to various commitments. In Section 4, we give an application of our schemes. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
Building Blocks
The schemes we present in this section are based on the following assumption, introduced e.g. in [13] :
Strong RSA Assumption: There exist an efficient algorithm that on input |n| outputs an RSA-modulus n and an element z ∈ Z * n such that it is infeasible to find integers e ∈ {−1, 1} and u such that z = u e mod n.
The Fujisaki-Okamoto Commitment Scheme
In this subsection, we briefly describe the commitment scheme we use throughout this paper. Let s be a security parameter. Let n be a large composite number whose factorization is unknown by Alice and Bob, g be an element of large order in Z * n and h be an element of large order of the group generated by g such that both the discrete logarithm of g in base h and the discrete logarithm of h in base g are unknown by Alice. We denote by E = E(x, r) = g x h r mod n a commitment to x in base (g, h), where r is randomly selected over {−2 s n + 1, ..., 2 s n − 1}. This commitment has first appeared in [13] .
Proposition 1 E(x, r) is a statistically secure commitment scheme, i.e.:
-Alice is unable to commit herself to two values x 1 and x 2 such that x 1 = x 2 (in Z) by the same commitment unless she can factor n or solve the discrete logarithm of g in base h or the discrete logarithm of h in base g. In other words, under the factoring assumption, it is computationally infeasible to compute x 1 , x 2 , r 1 , r 2 where x 1 = x 2 such that E(x 1 , r 1 ) = E(x 2 , r 2 ). -E(x, r) statistically reveals no information to Bob. More formally, there exists a simulator which outputs simulated commitments to x which are statistically indistinguishable from true ones.
As Alice only knows one couple of numbers (x, r) such that E = g x h r mod n, we say that x is the value committed by (or hidden by) E, and that E hides the secret x.
Proof that Two Commitments Hide the Same Secret
Let t, l, s 1 and s 2 be four security parameters. Let n be a large composite number whose factorization is unknown by Alice and Bob, g 1 be an element of large order in Z * n and g 2 , h 1 , h 2 be elements of the group generated by g 1 such that the discrete logarithm of g 1 in base h 1 , the discrete logarithm of h 1 in base g 1 , the discrete logarithm of g 2 in base h 2 and the discrete logarithm of h 2 in base g 2 are unknown by Alice. Let H be a hash-function which outputs 2t-bit strings. We denote by E 1 (x, r 1 ) = g x 1 h r1 1 mod n a commitment to x in base (g 1 , h 1 ) where r 1 is randomly selected over [2 s1 n + 1, 2 s1 n − 1], and E 2 (x, r 2 ) = g x 2 h r2 2 mod n a commitment to x in base (g 2 , h 2 ) where r 2 is randomly selected over [−2 s2 n + 1, 2 s2 n − 1]. Alice secretly holds x ∈ [0, b]. Let E = E 1 (x, r 1 ) and F = E 2 (x, r 2 ) be two commitments to x. She wants to prove to Bob that she knows x, r 1 , r 2 such that E = E 1 (x, r 1 ) and F = E 2 (x, r 2 ), i.e. that E and F hide the same secret x.
This protocol is derived from proofs of equality of two discrete logarithms from [6, 12, 1] , combined with a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm modulo n [16] .
Protocol: P K(x, r 1 , r 2 : E = E 1 (x, r 1 ) ∧ F = E 2 (x, r 2 )).
Alice picks random
It is shown in [9] that a successful execution of this protocol convinces Bob that the numbers hidden in E and F are equal provided the Strong RSA problem is infeasible.
Characteristics of this proof: For |n| = 1024 bits, |b| = 512 bits, t = 80, l = 40, s 1 = 40 and s 2 = 552.
-completeness: The proof always succeeds.
-soundness: Under the strong RSA assumption, a cheating prover can succeed with probability less than 2 × 2 −t = 2 −79 . -zero-knowledge: Statistically zero-knowledge in the random-oracle model if 1/l is negligible. -length of the proof: 2, 648 + 2|x| bits = 3672 bits = 0.448 kB.
Proof that a Committed Number is a Square
Let t, l, and s be three security parameters. Let n be a large composite number whose factorization is unknown by Alice and Bob, g be an element of large order in Z * n and h be an element of the group generated by g such that both the discrete logarithm of g in base h and the discrete logarithm of h in base g are unknown by Alice. Let H be a hash-function which outputs 2t-bit strings. We denote by E(x, r) = g x h r mod n a commitment to x in base (g, h) where r is randomly selected over [−2 s n + 1, 2 s n − 1]. Alice secretly holds x ∈ [0, b]. Let E = E(x 2 , r 1 ) be a commitment to the square of x (in Z). She wants to prove to Bob that she knows x and r 1 such that E = E(x 2 , r 1 ), i.e. that E hides the square x 2 . The first proof that a committed number is a square has appeared in [13] .
Protocol: P K(x, r 1 : E = E(x 2 , r 1 )).
1. Alice picks random r 2 ∈ [−2 s n + 1, 2 s n − 1] and computes F = E(x, r 2 ). 2. Then, Alice computes r 3 = r 1 − r 2 x (in Z). Note that r 3 ∈ [−2 s bn + 1, 2 s bn − 1]. Then, E = F x h r3 mod n. 3. As E is a commitment to x in base (F, h) and F is a commitment to x in base (g, h), Alice can run P K(x, r 2 , r 3 : F = g x h r2 mod n ∧ E = F x h r3 mod n), the proof that two commitments hide the same secret described in section 2. 
The soundness of this protocol is clear: if Alice is able to compute F and a proof that E and F are commitments to the same numberx resp. in base (F, h) and (g, h), then Alice knowsx,r 2 andr 3 such that E = Fxhr 3 = gx 2 hxr 2+r3 = gx 2 hr 1 mod n. Then, this proof shows that Alice knowsx 2 , a square which is hidden in the commitment E. In other words, a successful execution of this protocol convinces Bob that the value hidden in the commitment E is a square in Z.
Technical proofs of the soundness and the zero-knowledgeness of this protocol are easily obtained from the properties of the previous protocol.
-soundness: Under the strong RSA assumption, a cheating prover can succeed with probability less than 2 × 2 −t = 2 −79 . -zero-knowledge: Statistically zero-knowledge in the random-oracle model if 1/l is negligible. -length of the proof: 3, 672 + 2|x| bits = 4696 bits = 0.573 kB.
Our Schemes

Proof that a committed number belongs to an interval
Let t, l and s be three security parameters. Let n be a large composite number whose factorization is unknown by Alice and Bob, g be an element of large order in Z * n and h be an element of the group generated by g such that both the discrete logarithm of g in base h and the discrete logarithm of h in base g are unknown by Alice. We denote by E(x, r) = g x h r mod n a commitment to x in base (g, h) where r is randomly selected over [−2 s n + 1, 2 s n − 1].
3.1.1 Proof with Tolerance: δ = 1 + ε The above protocol allows Alice to prove to Bob that the committed number
[Knowledge of x]
Alice executes with Bob:
Both Alice and Bob computeẼ = E/g a mod n andĒ = g b /E mod n. Alice setsx = x − a andx = b − x. Now, Alice must prove to Bob that bothẼ andĒ hide secrets which are greater than −θ.
[Decomposition ofx andx]
Alice computes:
[Choice of random values for new commitments]
Alice randomly selectsr 1 andr 2 in [−2 s n+1, ..., 2 s n−1] such thatr 1 +r 2 = r, andr 1 andr 2 such thatr 1 +r 2 = −r.
[Computation of new commitments]
Alice computes: Alice executes with Bob P K(x 1 ,r 1 :
,r 1 )). which prove that bothẼ 1 andĒ 1 hide a square.
[Validity of the commitments to a small value]
Let θ = 2
Alice executes with Bob the two following CFT proofs: 
Sketch of analysis:
After a successful execution of this protocol, Bob is convinced that :
-Ẽ 1 andĒ 1 hide numbers which are positive integers, as they are squares (Step 7). -Ẽ 2 andĒ 2 hide numbers which are greater than −θ (Step 8).
-Alice knows the values hidden byẼ andĒ (Step 1 and 2 ). -The number hidden inẼ is the sum of the number hidden inẼ 1 and of the number hidden inẼ 2 , and so areĒ,Ē 1 andĒ 2 (Step 6).
So, Bob is convinced thatẼ andĒ hide numbers which are greater than −θ, as they are the sum of a positive number and a number greater than −θ. Let x be the number known by Alice (from step 1) and hidden by E. Bob is convinced that x − a is the value hidden byẼ and b − x is the value hidden bȳ E. So, Bob is convinced that x − a ≥ −θ and b − x ≥ −θ, i.e. that x belongs to
Expansion rate: Following Definition 2, the expansion rate is equal to :
where:
ε is negligible if and only if |b − a| ≥ 2t + 2l + 2z + 4, where z is a security parameter. If it is the case, the expansion rate is equal to δ = 1 + 2 −z .
Characteristics of this proof: for |n| = 1024 bits, |b − a| = 512 bits t = 80, l = 40 and s = 40.
-length of the proof: 13860 bits = 1.692 kB.
-expansion rate: δ = 1 + ε, where ε ≤ 2 t+l+2− |b−a| 2 = 2 −134 .
Proof without Tolerance: δ = 1
The above protocol allows Alice to prove to Bob that the committed number x ∈ [a, b] belongs to the desired interval [a, b] . To achieve a proof of membership without tolerance, we artificially enlarge the size of x by setting x = 2 T x, where T = 2(t + l + 1) + |b − a|. Let E = E
2
T . E is a Fujisaki-Okamoto commitment to x = 2 T x that Alice can open. By using the first scheme, Alice proves to Bob that she knows the value x hidden by E is such that x ∈ [2 T a−2
). As T = 2(t + l + 1) + |b − a|, we have:
Alice does not know the factorization of n, she is unable to know two different values in Z hidden by E . So, necessarily, x = 2 T x. The proof convinces Bob that 2 Protocol: P K(x, r : E = E(x, r) ∧ x ∈ [a, b]).
[Setting]
Both Alice and Bob compute E = E 2 T , where T = 2(t + l + 1) + |b − a|.
[Proof]
Characteristics of this proof: for |n| = 1024 bits, |b − a| = 512 bits, t = 80, l = 40 and s = 40.
-length of the proof: 16176 bits = 1.975 kB.
-expansion rate: δ = 1.
Extensions
The above protocols can be used to prove that:
-a discrete logarithm modulo a composite number n whose factorization is unknown to Alice belongs to an interval. Let g be an element of large order in Z * n and h be an element of the group generated by g such that both the discrete logarithm of g in base h and the discrete logarithm of h in base g are unknown by Alice. Let x be such that y = g x mod n. Alice randomly selects r and computes y = h r mod n. She proves to Bob that she knows a discrete logarithm of y in base h, and then that yy = g x h r mod n is a commitment to a value which belongs to the given interval.
-a discrete logarithm modulo p (a prime number or a composite number whose factorization is known to Alice) belongs to an interval. Let x be such that Y = G x mod p. Alice randomly selects r and computes E = E(x, r) = g x h r mod n, a commitment to x. Then, she executes with Bob P K(x, r :
-a third root (or, more generally, a e-th root) modulo N belongs to an interval.
Let x be such that Y = x 3 mod N . Alice randomly selects r and computes E = E(x, r) = g x h r mod n, a commitment to x. Then, she executes with
Note: to prove that a committed number x lies in I ∪ J, Alice proves that x lies in I or x lies in J by using a proof of "or" by [5] .
Application to Verifiable Encryption
As one of the several applications of proofs of membership to an interval, we present in this section an efficient (publicly) verifiable encryption scheme.
Alice has sent two encrypted messages to Charlie and Deborah, and wants to prove to Bob that the two ciphertexts encrypt the same message.
Charlie and Deborah use the Okamoto-Uchiyama [18] cryptosystem, i.e. Charlie holds a composite number
C is p C , and Deborah holds a composite number
To encrypt a message m such that 0 ≤ m ≤ 2 k−1 intended to Charlie, Alice computes E C = g m C h rC C mod n C , where r C is randomly selected over Z * nC . In the same way, she encrypts the same message m intended to Deborah by computing
Now, Alice wants to prove to Bob that the two ciphertexts E C and E D encrypt the same message.
First, she executes with Bob P K(m, r C , r D : 
Conclusion
We have presented in this paper efficient proofs that a committed number belongs to an interval and give examples of applications, more particularly an efficient verifiable encryption scheme. By their efficiency, they are well suited to be used in various cryptographic protocols.
A Proof of equality of two committed numbers in different moduli
This proof originally appeared in [4] and independently in [10] in a more general form. Let t, l and s be three security parameters. Let n 1 be a large composite number whose factorization is unknown by Alice and Bob, and n 2 be another large number, prime or composite whose factorization is known or unknown by Alice. Let g 1 be an element of large order in Z * n1 and h 1 be an element of the group generated by g 1 such that both the discrete logarithm of g 1 in base h 1 and the discrete logarithm of h 1 in base g 1 are unknown by Alice. Let g 2 be an element of large order in Z * n2 and h 2 be an element of the group generated by g 2 such that both the discrete logarithm of g 2 in base h 2 and the discrete logarithm of h 2 in base g 2 are unknown by Alice. Let H be a hash-function which outputs 2t-bit strings. We denote by E 1 (x, r 1 ) = g x 1 h r1 1 mod n 1 a commitment to x in base (g 1 , h 1 ) where r 1 is randomly selected over {−2 s n + 1, ..., 2 s n − 1}, and E 2 (x, r 2 ) = g x 2 h r2 2 mod n 2 a commitment to x in base (g 2 , h 2 ) where r 2 is randomly selected over {−2 s n + 1, ..., 2 s n − 1}. Alice secretly holds x ∈ {0, . . . , b}. Let E = E 1 (x, r 1 ) and F = E 2 (x, r 2 ) be two commitments to x. She wants to prove to Bob that she knows x, r 1 , r 2 such that E = E 1 (x, r 1 ) and F = E 2 (x, r 2 ), i.e. that E and F hide the same secret x.
